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Abstract 
The Task Force has emerged as a mechanism for co-ordinating economic 
development activity in the context of the current New Labour government’s 
emphasis upon including ‘stakeholders’ in ‘joined-up’ approaches to ‘cross-cutting’ 
issues. The paper examines the use of Task Forces to organise economic development 
at employer, sectoral and territorial levels at the local and regional scale in the North 
East region of England. The study argues that New Labour’s experimental use of Task 
Forces reflects a particular mediation of more general tendencies in the historical 
evolution of state modernisation that varies in particular and contingent ways at the 
local and regional level. The research reveals the continued importance of the existing 
public and public/private sector institutions, the less significant and contingent role of 
the private sector and the Task Force’s contribution to the UK’s ‘quasi-governance’ 
with its problems of co-ordination, transparency and accountability. A renewed 
politics of economic development governance is required to establish the 
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accountability and legitimacy of such bodies in the context of the UK political 
economy’s emergent multi-layered governance system. 
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Introduction 
 
“We are calling on the Government to put together a task force, in the same 
way it has done for other parts of the country, to minimise the effect this will 
have on workers and their families” (North East Chamber of Commerce 
Spokesman, quoted in The Journal 15 July 2000). 
 
And so another Task Force was born. This time to address the job losses from the 
Corus steel-making operations in Teesside. The Task Force 'phenomenon' (Barker et 
al., 1999) or 'revolution' (MacLeod, 1998) has seen this form of organisation multiply 
rapidly across government. At the national level, 295 Task Forces had been 
established between 1997 and 1999 to address a multitude of policy design and 
implementation questions (Barker et al., 1999). The Task Force has been especially 
prevalent in addressing economic development concerns. The former DETR 
established 39 Task Forces (13% of the total), including the high profile Coalfields 
and Urban Task Forces (1998), and the model has been utilised by the devolved 
administrations (House of Commons, 2001). Task Forces have also been sprouting at 
the local and regional levels throughout the UK. What Bennett et al. (2000: 6) 
describes, referring to the Coalfields Task Force, as a “unique intervention in the 
politics of regeneration”. The North East region of England in particular has seen a 
dramatic flowering of Task Forces in economic development activity, where 28 have 
been established (all but one since 1997), focused upon employers, sectors  
and/or territories. 
 
Despite their ‘bacterial growth’ (Barker et al., 1999), little is known about the 
establishment, operation, organisation, funding, membership or effectiveness of such 
Task Forces. This paper examines these issues by analysing the experience of the 
North East region of England in using Task Forces to organise economic 
development. First, these developments are situated in the context of the historical 
evolution of state modernisation and New Labour’s role in unleashing the Task Force 
‘revolution’ since 1997. Second, recent commentary on the Task Force phenomenon 
is reviewed. Third, questions of definition, origin and analysis are tackled. Fourth, the 
empirical case is examined and critical issues for Task Forces in organising economic 
development activity are raised. The study argues that New Labour’s experimental 
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use of Task Forces reflects a particular mediation of more general tendencies in the 
historical evolution of state modernisation that varies in particular and contingent 
ways at the local and regional level. The research reveals the continued importance of 
the existing public and public/private sector institutions, the less significant and 
contingent role of the private sector and the Task Force’s contribution to the UK’s 
‘quasi-governance’ with its problems of co-ordination, transparency and 
accountability. In the face of growing criticism and adverse reaction to the 
‘governance by expertise’ embodied in Task Forces, a renewed and democratised 
politics of economic development governance is required to establish the 
accountability and legitimacy of such bodies in the context of the UK political 
economy’s emergent multi-layered governance system. 
 
 
Issues in the current era of the historical evolution of state modernisation 
The historical evolution of ‘modern’ nation states has undergone an intensified and 
profound period of change since the emergent crisis of the post-war growth settlement 
and (neo-)Keynesian welfarist state forms in the early 1970s (Anderson, 1995; Block, 
1994; Habermas, 1999). The ensuing three decades have witnessed protracted debate 
concerning the changing nature of the state, concerning several general tendencies. 
First, the deepened internationalisation – or even ‘globalisation’ (Held et al., 1999) – 
of the world economy has led to the apparent ‘hollowing out’ of nation states as 
powers and responsibilities have been lost to supranational, sub-national, regional and 
local institutions (Jessop, 1997). This ‘hollowing out’ thesis argues that a more 
complex – multi-layered – governance system has emerged with heightened 
interpenetration between formerly discrete policy domains and institutions operating 
at different scales (Held et al., 1999) within which (for some) the nation state retains a 
pivotal role (Boyer and Drache, 1996; Habermas, 1999; Hirst and Thompson, 1999). 
 
Second, political economic ideology and state strategy has been dominated by the 
‘global neo-classicism’ of neo-liberalism from the late 1970s (Michie and Grieve 
Smith, 1995). While containing an array of national variants, a common political 
economic project and policy programme of deregulation/liberalisation, fiscal austerity 
and monetary control have underpinned the reshaping of state forms and strategies 
(Berger and Dore, 1996; Rogers Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). The mid-1990s 
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witnessed reflection upon the performance of the twin poles of 1980s-style market 
liberalism and pre-1980s state interventionism in the context of the post-1989 
transition in the centrally planned economies of the former Eastern bloc (Hodgson, 
1999). Debate has ensued concerning a putative ‘Third Way’ political economic 
project between market and state to provide a guiding theoretical shell for state 
modernisation (Giddens, 1998; Habermas, 1999). Commentators claim that in the 
current era of ‘globalisation’ rapid and closely inter-related changes are creating 
unprecedented levels of uncertainty and complexity such that neither traditional state-
centred Left nor market-oriented Right approaches are solely viable for state policy. 
 
Third, there is an apparent crisis of faith in the institutions of government and 
traditional forms of representative democracy (Block, 1994; Leadbetter and Mulgan, 
1997). Public distrust in politicians and the political process is rife and manifest in 
falling electoral turnouts, public cynicism and the rise of non-traditional bases of 
collective action (Held et al., 1999). Echoing the classical liberal view of the state 
(Block, 1994), this tendency has emphasised the failure in the capacities of public 
institutions to deliver sustained prosperity and has beset especially the advanced 
industrial economies (Gray, 1997; Habermas, 1999). 
 
These generalised tendencies have punctuated the current period of state 
modernisation and created a context of uncertainty and complexity. This situation is 
marked by perhaps several emergent issues. First, a post-ideological pragmatism 
appears to be shaping the political economic projects of nation states. Some claim 
state strategy and action is no longer easily ascribed a ‘Left’ or ‘Right’ label as 
innovative combinations of market and/or state solutions are brought together to 
address intractable problems (e.g. Giddens, 1995; Turner, 2001). In this pragmatic 
climate the simplistic ‘quantitative’ understanding of the deepening or withdrawal of 
state intervention appears to have been exhausted (Block, 1994). In its place, more 
nuanced conceptions of ‘qualitative’ changes in the mode and nature of state forms 
have been suggested (O’Neill, 1997) – as states simultaneously both cede (e.g. 
monetary, fiscal policy) and extend (e.g. welfare state, institutional forms of 
government) powers in different areas (Martin and Sunley, 1997). 
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Second, a sense of failure and uncertainty has triggered a wave of profound 
reorganisation and ‘institutional searching’ (Peck and Tickell, 1994). While changes 
in the state’s internal mode of operation is response to external crises is not in itself 
new (see Offe, 1975), experimentation with new forms of governing and policy 
development and delivery has expanded dramatically in the current era:  
“In every capitalist nation, the old institutional frameworks are being 
abandoned as economic organisations, social groups and states themselves 
search for new institutional configurations more congruent with the markedly 
different, and still rapidly changing, economic conditions of ‘post-Fordism’” 
(Martin, 1999: 4). 
Such changes have comprised far reaching constitutional reforms and devolutionary 
projects aimed at reorganising the structures of central, regional and local government 
(Tomaney, 2000). The ‘de-statization’ of the political system is evident (Jessop 1997: 
574). This process is reflected in the shift from government to governance across 
territorial scales and functions and in the: 
 “movement from the central role of official state apparatus in securing state-
sponsored economic and social projects and political hegemony towards an 
emphasis on partnerships between governmental, para-governmental and non-
governmental organizations in which the state apparatus is often only first 
among equals” (Jessop 1997: 574-575). 
For Jessop (1997: 575) this involves governance – that is, “the complex art of steering 
multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous 
from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal 
interdependence”. Such ‘quasi-government’ has been functional to states to 
incorporate independent specialised expertise and to devolve responsibility but has 
raised concerns about co-ordination, transparency and accountability (Morgan and 
Roberts, 1993; Skelcher et al., 2000). However, Jessop (1997) also recognises that 
government still has a key role to play in the counter tendency of ‘meta-governance’ 
through, for example, setting the ground rules for governance and ensuring the 
compatibility of different governance mechanisms and regimes. 
 
The generalised tendencies and emerging issues evident in the current era in the 
historical evolution of state modernisation carry with them no necessary nor 
deterministic changes. While common elements clearly exist and inter-state learning 
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is evident (Jessop, 1997), the extent to which ‘hollowing out’, ‘Third Way’ strategy 
and the crisis of faith and experimentation with government institutions have 
proceeded differs significantly between and within nation states. Pressures for 
reorganisation are mediated by particular nation states and their concrete 
manifestations are contingent and remain empirical questions. The specific ways in 
which such forces are reflected in the mode and nature of state forms and strategies 
are unavoidably refracted by the particular historical evolution of the nation state 
(Hodgson, 1999), and its position within both the international division of labour and 
the multi-level governance system operating across and between supranational, 
national, sub-national, regional and local scales. The reality for the changing mode 
and nature of state action in different national contexts is graduated and complex and 
combines evidence of radical transitions and resistance with a mix of old and new 
pressures and experiments (Martin and Sunley, 1997). This era in the evolution of 
state modernisation is the context within which New Labour’s experiments with Task 
Forces may be understood. 
 
 
Interpreting New Labour’s Task Force ‘revolution’ 
 
“Labourites had to offset their mummified economies with an ostentatious 
display of verbosely political radicalism – ‘youthism’, ‘high-technicism’, 
millennial and style-mania, and the accumulation of think-tanks and divining 
rods in appropriate official, quasi-official and entirely spontaneous 
polyhedrons” (Nairn, 2000: 50). 
 
The particular pattern of recent development in the UK state reflects its specific 
mediation of the general tendencies and emerging issues in the historical evolution of 
state modernisation. The current era of New Labour in government has presaged a 
series of significant changes in the UK political economy, including nods in the 
direction of ‘Third Way’ and ‘Stakeholder Capitalism’ ideas (Hutton, 1999); 
constitutional reforms and devolution (Tomaney, 2000); post-ideological pragmatism 
based upon evidence-based public policy making (Stewart, 1999); new combinations 
of market discipline and state facilitation (Peck, 1999); experimentation with new 
organisational/territorial modes of co-ordination (Bennett and Payne, 2001); and the 
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involvement of external expertise in the body politic (Barker et al., 1999). Views 
differ regarding the coherence and significance of such changes. For some, New 
Labour’s political project fits within a centrist renewal of social democracy through 
its experimentation with the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1998). Critical accounts question 
the ideologically rootless and opportunistic nature of New Labour (Hutton, 1999). 
Some claim New Labour has been actively ‘hollowing out’ the UK state through, 
amongst other forces: “a näive faith in the capacity of innumerable local partnerships, 
specialist agencies and ‘little platoons’ to deliver the goods locally (in an innovative 
as well as cheap fashion)” (Peck, 1999: 133). 
 
While their significance remains in question, the current growth of Task Forces across 
government appears to occupy a key role in New Labour’s state modernisation  
project. An integral part of its vision of ‘holistic government’ and revitalising 
territorial governance has been the emphasis upon including interest groups 
(‘stakeholders’) in far reaching and inter-connected (‘joined-up’) approaches to 
intractable (‘wicked’ or ‘cross-cutting’) issues (Mawson, 1999). This approach has 
sought to reduce ‘departmentalism’, decentralise decision-making and encourage 
innovation in a bid to combat the forces of fragmentation and disintegration that have 
hampered Government institutions and policy in recent decades. This vision has 
resulted in a rash of experimentation with new organisational/territorial modes of co-
ordination – Task Forces, Zones, Priority Action Teams, Horizontal Working Groups, 
Inter-Agency Projects and Neighbourhoods. Echoing a ‘new centrism’ in economic 
development (Geddes and Newman, 1999) such institutional experiments have 
become widespread (Stewart, 1999). 
 
Upon closer inspection, opinion is divided on the place of Task Forces in this 
particular era of New Labour state modernisation. Recent writing has focused on the 
role of Task Forces in policy development and government at the national level. On 
the Centre-Left, Macleod (1998) traced the emergence of Task Forces to the 
independent Industry Forum – established “to facilitate informal non-doctrinaire 
dialogue” between business and the Labour Party – that ‘pioneered’ the Task Force 
idea in the early 1990s. Macleod saw Task Forces as effective, flexible and ad hoc 
arrangements that provide the necessary outside help and guidance to ‘open up’ the 
Whitehall machine and deal with cross-cutting issues. In this analysis, each Task 
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Force implies the search for consensus and demonstrates the Government’s 
commitment to partnership working and transparency. Macleod concluded that it is 
unclear and perhaps too early to say, first, whether the Task Force revolution is either 
a “one-off political fad with a limited shelf life” (p. viii) or an evolving phenomenon, 
and second, whether Task Forces will have a significant or lasting impact on policy 
outcomes. 
 
Barker et al. (1999) provided a thorough audit of the Task Force phenomenon in the 
body politic within the UK. They argued that there is nothing new in state attempts to 
co-opt the expertise of external interests into state activity (e.g. the Webb’s ‘industrial 
and social chamber’) but the scale and character of the current Task Force 
phenomenon suggests it is more pervasive and influential. In contrast to Macleod’s 
more positive claims, they are concerned about Task Forces’ lack of accountability 
and haphazard management by government. Lord Smith of Clifton (Barker et al., 
1999: 7) makes the point that the Task Forces: “…must not be allowed to coagulate 
into an hermetically sealed policy universe that effectively undermines due process 
and inhibits widespread open discussion”. Barker et al. (1999) conclude that Task 
Forces are a ‘new governing species’ that has avoided the public gaze and has the 
potential to neglect the public that they are designed to serve. Skelcher et al.’s (2000: 
12) analysis of the advance of the ‘Quango State’ under New Labour highlighted the 
“unforeseen and unsupervised” rush of Task Forces created after 1997. For them, this 
ad hoc flourish of executive power has added to the ‘quasi-governance’ of the UK as 
their members remain outside the Nolan public appointment rules (justified on the 
basis of their temporary lifespan). Since such bodies were co-opted into Government 
at an influential time for policy making and some had lasted long enough to become 
permanent Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) and hence be ‘Nolanised’, 
Skelcher et al. (2000) argue that they should be included in reforms to increase 
transparency and accountability of the ‘Quango State’. 
 
Platt’s (1998) ‘Government by Task Force’ argued that the ‘mushrooming’ of Task 
Forces raises serious questions about New Labour’s style of government. The 
allegedly inclusive and pluralist nature of Task Forces is questioned since the voices 
of women, ethnic minorities, youth and organised labour are inadequately represented 
relative to business and the private sector. Further, Platt (1998: 4) argues that:  
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“the Task Forces and review bodies have been designed to foster support for 
its [government] policies, rather than debate about them. Their main objective 
is to neutralise political opposition and to create a new national consensus 
around the central tenets of Blairism”.  
Platt concluded that ‘New Labour’ is using Task Forces to concentrate power in the 
centre and to govern through a wider range of elites, bypassing both public and 
parliament. A neo-Marxist reading of the Task Force phenomenon might go further in 
its criticism. Such institutional experiments might be interpreted as an attempt by the 
state to internalise and contain territorialised accumulation crises arising from the 
necessary contradictions of capitalism that, in due course, ultimately emerge to 
undermine the state’s mode of crisis management (Habermas, 1975). A Task Force 
could be seen as a compensatory institutional intervention by the state that seeks to 
defend the existing socio-economic order by mopping up the consequences of 
localised capital devalorisation and exempting capital from significant reparations.  
 
While focusing upon more formalised NDPBs (e.g. Commissions, boards and 
regulatory authorities), Centre-Right commentators too are critical of New Labour’s 
voluntary transfer of decision-making power from the executive to new independent 
bodies staffed by technocratic elites (Mather, 2000). Such bodies – which go “beyond 
the odd business leader brought in, singly or in a task force to help a government 
department” (p. 8-9) – ‘de-politicise’ decisions, remove responsibility from ministers 
and raise constitutional questions concerning their accountability. McElwee (2000) 
argued that New Labour is ‘surreptitiously’ creating a ‘New Class’ by rewarding 
supporters with patronage and positions of power at the heart of government. This 
‘cronyism’, disputed by Barker et al. (1999), is creating a new establishment 
convinced of the virtues of social engineering. Alongside quangos, special advisors 
and peerages: “Another significant vehicle for the rise of this New Class has been the 
Task Force, creating Government policy behind the scenes” (p. iii). The 
Government’s ‘big tent’ approach is said to stifle dissent, undermine Civil Service 
neutrality, trivialise the political process and marginalise parliament. Contrasting 
Barker et al.’s (1999) ‘de-politicisation’ concern, McElwee claims that private life is 
becoming more politicised by interests concerned with state intervention. McElwee’s 
New Class is a new governing elite that is “self-serving, self-regarding and self-
rewarding” (2000: p. ii). 
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This review of the place of Task Forces in this specific period of New Labour’s state 
modernisation project suggests that, first, new, flexible and often experimental 
institutional forms, employing innovative modes of organisational/territorial co-
ordination, have changed markedly in their scale and character since 1997. Second, 
these institutional forms have become instrumental to New Labour as a mechanism 
for incorporating a plural array of (potentially elite) interests (especially from the 
producer/private sectors but less from women, youth, ethnic minorities and trade 
unions) to provide independent and specialised guidance for policy development 
across government. Third, the new institutional forms may work to concentrate power 
centrally by providing a means through which responsibility (rather than power) can 
be devolved, debate stifled and decisions ‘de-politicised’. Last, the co-ordination, 
transparency and accountability of these new forms of organisation, particularly 
within a multi-layered governance structure, are haphazard and often unclear as they 
appear to operate outside of the conventional structures of public scrutiny. However, 
in focusing upon Task Forces in particular, little is still known about why they have 
been used in specific policy areas, how they get established, what they actually do, 
how they are organised and funded, and whether or not they are effective. Such 
questions provide the research agenda for examining Task Forces in economic 
development at the local and regional level in the case of the North East region of 
England. 
 
 
Definition, origin and analysis 
 
“The word ‘Task Force’ has become a buzzword…  …in the absence of any 
definition…  …wide statistical differences [in their estimated numbers] 
demonstrate the absence of any common starting point. One person’s ‘Task 
Force’ is clearly another person’s ‘review’” (Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, 2000: 124). 
 
In definitional terms, Task Forces remain slippery creatures. National studies identify 
functionally diverse bodies that serve a variety of purposes and cover a multiplicity of 
issues. The new bodies even go by different names: Task Forces, advisory groups, 
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action groups, sounding boards. Their classification is neither a simple or neat 
exercise. Most Task Forces were established by Ministers early in New Labour’s 
tenure: “to investigate and recommend new policies and practices or… …practical 
means of implementing policies” (Barker et al., 1999: 11). They were different from 
established government practice in the scale of their inclusion of ‘external’ interests 
(particularly business), independence and operation within a given and limited time 
frame. A distinction was also drawn between these new bodies and the reviews and 
consultation exercises that were routine Civil Service work as well as Royal 
Commissions, Departmental Committees of Inquiry, Standing Expert Advisory 
Committees and Standing Statutory Advisory Boards.  
 
The explosive growth of Task Forces after 1997 may be traced to reflection within the 
Civil Service. New ideas emerged concerning innovation in government 
administration. First, discussion ensued about the creation of government (rather than 
external) ‘task forces’ for issues where: “if it will take two to six months hard work, it 
should go to a task force – but if, and only if, it requires substantial inter-departmental 
co-ordination. Anything requiring much longer preparation should go to a Royal 
Commission” (Daniel 1997). Second, concern developed around the need for 
“radically re-engineered forms of government, perhaps around project teams staffed 
by skilled specialists and supported by a central core” (Wintour, 2000).  
 
During the early days of New Labour, Ministers, Whitehall press officers and the 
media were often happy to call almost any new inquiry a ‘new government Task 
Force’. Parts of government even felt they were missing out: “We haven’t set up any 
task forces yet, but it is under review” (Welsh Office spokersperson cited in Daniel, 
1997: 27). The name assumed an urgent, pseudo-military connotation that the 
Government was doing something positive and timely about an issue, contrasting with 
the softer language of partnership, community development and neighbourhood 
renewal. Military metaphors such as Task Forces lend purpose and apparent 
determination to political gestures (Mullan, 2001). 
 
The way in which Task Forces have been used at the local and regional level to 
address economic development concerns suggests they too are not homogenous 
creatures and go by a variety of names (e.g. Task Forces, Task Groups, Response 
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Groups, Rapid Response Groups and Action Groups). The lack of definition for Task 
Forces reflects the lack of a clearly defined model. There is no evidence of a 
‘Whitehall template’ nor record of Task Forces in the North East at the centre of 
Government (Regional Policy Unit, DTI, Author’s interview, 2000). Historically, 
creatures similar to Task Forces existed in de-industrialised regions in the early 1980s 
(Keating and Boyle, 1987). However, the current crop even lack a distinct linkage to 
the 1981 ‘Merseyside Task Force’ (MTF). The MTF represented “a hitherto untried 
mode of regional based combined inter-departmental and public/private sector 
collaboration” (Lindley, 1985: 70) reporting directly to a senior member of the 
Cabinet Office. Bodies similar to the MTF were utilised in urban policy circles during 
the 1980s (Greenhalgh, 1999). 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the late 1990s emergence of the Task Force (with 
various individuals and interests claiming they have invented it anew), some common 
identifying characteristics are required if the concept is to be used for meaningful 
analysis. Such elements might include: multi-agency; selected and invited 
membership; ultimately temporary but initially indeterminate period of operation 
(unlike national Task Forces); non-statutory (i.e. non-Quangos); established for 
specific purposes; flexible and 'rapid response' operation often via working sub-
groups; and working across a range of inter-related levels (employer, sector and/or 
territory). These dimensions differ in their extent in particular Task Forces (not least 
in their names) but at least some of these general features are evident. Task Forces 
share many characteristics with the more commonly recognised partnerships prevalent 
in the 1990s. Indeed, some writers use the terms interchangeably (e.g. Bennett et al., 
2000). The main differences are, first, Task Forces have an indeterminately temporary 
life – existing long enough to address their stated objectives – whereas partnerships 
often have clearly fixed lifespans from their inception, and, second, Task Forces have 
a more pronounced crisis-laden flavour. 
 
Task Forces have different generic roles: advisory (collecting, analysing and 
dispensing information and advice relating to policy) and implementation (spending 
money and implementing policy on the ground). Several of the national economic 
development Task Forces (e.g. Coalfields and Urban Task Forces) were advisory and 
produced proposals for government action and then disbanded. The local and regional 
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economic development Task Forces have combined advisory and implementation 
roles in developing strategies and putting them into action through their members. 
Different modes of operation for Task Forces are discernable: reactive and 
regenerative and proactive and developmental. The former focuses upon relatively 
shorter-term time horizons (e.g. post-closure job search). The latter is medium to 
longer term and seeks a more fundamental analysis and development strategy for a 
sector or area. Each mode is not mutually exclusive and there is some evidence of the 
evolution between these modes as the depth and intractability of some economic 
development concerns are made apparent by Task Force activity.  
 
 
Task Forces for economic development in the North East region of England3 
The North East region of England continues to suffer from the economic, social and 
political malaise associated with structural change generated by the restructuring of its 
traditional economic base and its relatively marginal position within the national 
political economy (Pike, 1999a). The chronic nature of these problems has long meant 
the North East has been a ‘state-managed’ region (Hudson, 1998), susceptible to 
institutional experimentation in the field of economic development as part of state 
modernisation projects that dates back to the 1930s Team Valley Trading Estate. 
Regional agents too are cognisant of the need for adaptive institutions to effect 
economic renewal, as the RDA Chairman noted: “the North East must recognise that 
products and services will have a faster turnover rate and actively plan for closures 
and departures” (Bridge 2000: 5). This is the context in which the North East region 
has experienced a proliferation of Task Forces to organise economic development 
activity. 
 
Likened to a ‘hydra’ (RDA Chair, Author’s Interview 2000), the most recent count 
tallied at 28 such Task Forces (all but one established since 1997), involving 351 
individual organisational memberships (Table 1)4. Their rapid growth has been 
accompanied by a vision of their effectiveness amongst the ‘regional partnership’:  
“The Government Office has a long history of association with Task Forces in 
Durham through the East Durham Task Force. This was a model of its kind 
and achieved a deservedly high reputation for bringing together local partners 
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in a common cause” (Director Government Office North East (GO-NE) 
quoted in The Journal, 25 January 2000).  
Similarly, the RDA Chief Executive called the Task Forces ‘vital’ to targeting 
regeneration. An unformalised but nonetheless relatively coherent Task Force model 
has evolved largely through ‘learning by doing’, containing many of the general 
characteristics, roles and modes of operation identified above, although it remains 
flexible in its organisation to meet specific demands. The Fujitsu Response Group 
(1999) and, to a lesser degree, the East Durham Task Force (2000) final reports have 
been used to transfer practice and the Task Force has become part of the accepted 
response to recurrent economic development crises in the region. Such Task Forces 
have been much less prevalent at the local and regional level elsewhere in the UK’s 
regions and countries (e.g. Potteries/North Staffordshire, Prestwick/Scotland, 
Rover/West Midlands) (Barker et al., 1999; DTI Regional Policy Unit, Author’s 
Interview, 2000).  
 
 
Why have Task Forces been used? 
Task Forces have become an organisational mechanism for the timely and often rapid 
‘inclusion’ of a plural array of interests to address often crisis-laden economic 
development concerns. The establishment of a Task Force provides a focus for 
attention and effort for both existing partners and new partners brought in to provide 
further support. In contrast to the national picture, these Task Forces have been 
involved in both strategy and policy development and implementation. Similar issues 
were dealt with in less co-ordinated ways in the past. The protracted decline of jobs in 
the Durham coalfield from the 1960s, for example, was met with anti-closure 
campaigns from affected local communities but only piecemeal responses in 
economic development terms. The realisation of the inevitability of the coal industry’s 
demise triggered a more coherent response to regeneration and the establishment of 
arguably the region’s first (East Durham) Task Force by Durham County Council 
between 1990 and 2000. 
 
 
Who gets a Task Force and who doesn’t? 
H:\lucy\papers\e&pc-paper.doc 16 
There is no single way in which the Task Forces have been established and each is 
often contingent upon the evolution of particular circumstances. Some are the result of 
central government initiative and Ministerial decision-making (sometimes) in close 
consultation with regional local authorities, the RDA and GO-NE (Table 1). Others 
tend to be more locally grown and local authority-led. Establishing a Task Force has 
become highly politicised within the region. Objective criteria for Task Force 
establishment are noticeably lacking. Some interest groups have had to lobby in order 
to get their situation recognised as warranting a Task Force (e.g. GMB trade 
union/Textiles Task Force) (Pike et al., 1998). Others have had to wait for particular 
circumstances to unfold and the political climate to become more favourable (e.g. DTI 
support framework for the coal industry (South East Northumberland), ‘regionalising’ 
a national initiative (Oil and Gas Fabrication)). 
 
Recurrent economic development problems can lead to a short-term ‘firefighting’ 
approach that lacks a more strategic view and may be open to politically expedient 
manipulation. Despite the loss of nearly 4,000 jobs and pressure from regional trade 
unions, for example, the Textiles Task Force was not established until a major closure 
occurred in the Trade and Industry Secretary’s Tyneside North constituency. While it 
may be coincidence, the timing of the announcement did little to quell speculation 
about Ministers only responding to problems when they affected their own backyards.  
In addition, utilising Task Forces in this manner raised concerns regarding tokenism 
and symbolic policy gestures in the face of an allegedly inevitable 'globalisation' of 
economic activity. In response to the Groves Cranes closure on Wearside, the AEEU 
works convenor was clear: 
“We feel very disappointed. The Government and Peter Mandelson [then 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry] have really let us down and have let 
us fall away and go on the dole. The setting up of the task force was just a 
token gesture really – lip service – because since that original meeting at 
Government Office for the North East…we have heard absolutely nothing. 
The training fund would have been set up anyway, so it’s not like it is purely 
for us. We are just due to get a share of the £2.5m pool” (quoted in Ford, 
1998). 
In other cases, interest groups were adamant that they did not want the assignation of 
a Task Force to deal with their situation (e.g. firms undergoing redundancy 
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programmes). They feared that it may have drawn unwanted attention, undermined 
confidence and perhaps even hastened their decline. Some interests failed in their 
attempts to get a Task Force established – or at least one with sufficient scope and 
clout to command new resources – and fell back on more locally-grown solutions.  
 
 
What do Task Forces do? 
The strategic aims of the Task Forces were typically moulded by their particular 
circumstances and shaped by their membership. The first job was for the leading 
players to decide upon the membership and to draw up their terms of reference. Those 
addressing closures tended to keep their objectives flexible in order to respond rapidly 
to unfolding situations whereas the explicitly sectoral and territorial Task Forces often 
worked with more formalised and longer-term objectives. Each mixed advisory and 
implementation roles (Table 2). The area-based Task Forces had the most 
comprehensive brief to address deeper questions of structural adjustment. A transition 
was evident in the move away from an initial focus on ‘hard’, ‘bricks and mortar’ 
infrastructure issues to ‘softer’, people and social issues. The ways in which the Task 
Forces were established were often influenced by what they were set up to do. Where 
an area had been subject to concentrated economic decline, rather than establish 
separate Task Forces to respond to each situation, the opportunity was often taken to 
approach the structural problems of area regeneration in a more holistic and 
comprehensive manner. In Sunderland, for example, major employers Groves Cranes 
and the Vaux brewery closed with the loss of over 1,500 jobs in less than two years. 
The initial Groves Cranes Task Force evolved into the ‘Sunderland ARC’ initiative 
without a Vaux Task Force being established and is currently undergoing a further 
transition into an Urban Regeneration Company. 
 
Within the Task Forces it was unclear which member organisations had a legitimate 
claim to leadership and strategy. This depended upon the balance of membership 
between senior level 'leaders' and other organisational functionaries. Participant 
organisations often interpreted their role in the Task Force as part of a technocratic 
process whereby they simply discharged their specialist responsibilities. This 
effectively 'de-politicised' the issues and avoided wider debate.  
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While political action was evident behind the scenes, particularly in lobbying for their 
establishment, Task Forces typically attempted to keep politics and politicians out of 
their activities in order to encourage information exchange and limit leaks.  
 
Little attempt was made to question or contest economic development issues. In the 
case of closures Task Forces often appeared designed to allow companies to exit with 
the minimum embarrassment. Buttressed by their democratic legitimacy, local 
authorities came nearest to this questioning role in their political activity. For 
instance, South Tyneside Council leaders were involved in expressing concern, 
seeking clarification and offering support in response to rationalisation at local 
employers (Pike, 1999b). Generally, Task Forces remained narrowly project-focused 
and concerned with the task in hand. Leadership and strategy within the Task Forces 
often appeared driven by events rather than integrated within a broader regional 
development strategy. Whether this would have been different had their membership 
have been more inclusive is open to question. 
 
 
How are the Task Forces organised and funded? 
In organisational terms, Task Forces reflect a centralised policy agenda to a greater or 
lesser degree, depending upon who has established them and their purpose. Task 
Forces established by Ministers nationally are constituted by local and regional input 
but work within a centrally orchestrated framework and financial structure. 
Responsibility has been devolved to the local and regional level but the power 
remains concentrated in the national centre. Those charged with establishing and 
leading the Task Force often bring a main group together relatively quickly on an 
invitation-only basis. Senior individuals from the ‘regional partnership’ were enrolled 
to establish momentum and provide credibility, often delegating their involvement  as 
the Task Forces got to work. Membership was often kept tight, flexible and limited 
(ranging from 1 to 24 members, averaging 15) to those with something to ‘bring to the 
table’ to ensure rapid decision-making and a ‘business-like’ and ‘action-oriented’ 
approach. The initially larger membership present at Task Force inception meetings 
often whittled itself down through self-selection to those with resources to commit. 
Some interests were incorporated since it was considered better to have them working 
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with rather than against the Task Force. Close liaison and monitoring took place 
amongst members in a ‘can do’ atmosphere of co-operation and collaboration. Despite 
patchy commitments to being ‘inclusive’ and involving affected local interests, 
membership often had an exclusive look with relatively limited trades union and 
community involvement.  
 
Since the Task Forces were mobilised to address issues beyond the remit of any single 
organisation, membership brought together representatives from an array of selected 
economic development organisations involved in the region. The high profile Task 
Forces incorporated members from the upper levels of regional organisations whereas 
the lower profile concerns reflected a more locally grown flavour. The appropriate 
chair of the Task Forces depended upon the perceived importance and territorial 
extent of their remit. Task Forces typically considered that membership should be 
limited to allow them to work in an effective and expedient manner. Opening the 
process out was often interpreted as difficult with the potential for slowing and 
'bureaucratising' the Task Force. Selection was therefore justified as expanding the 
specialist capabilities of the group and bringing in particular perspectives rather than 
more democratic formal representation of interest groups. In the closure Task Forces 
it was felt that communication and information exchange could be hindered by the 
participation of aggrieved parties in the process. Here, selective membership was 
justified on the grounds of commercial confidentiality. However, these selection 
mechanisms left the Task Forces open to challenge regarding questions of 
transparency and accountability. There was some evidence of evolution in the Task 
Force form through one or two stages or through the consolidation of several existing 
bodies (Figure 1). Task Forces utilised relatively autonomous working sub-groups – 
whose membership varied and sometimes broadened – to address specific issues, 
report back to the main group and provide a manageable division of labour. 
 
The Task Forces were rarely direct funding vehicles in their own right and their aims 
were achieved by members ‘bending’ their mainstream programme budget. Funding 
came from a mixture of national (e.g. RSA, SRB) and EU (e.g. ERDF, ESF, CIs) 
sources, incorporating mainly the reallocation of general funds but also some specific 
measures (e.g. DfEE’s ‘Rapid Response Funding’; Textiles Task Force 
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‘Competitiveness Fund’). Task Forces appear resource-bound due to rarely any new 
funding. Funds have often been considered insufficient for the tasks in hand and often, 
given the rapid nature of the Task Force establishment, the mainstream programme 
budgets of members were already committed and not easily redeployed. Many Task 
Force members were therefore left to fund their participation from their mainstream 
budgets when an ability to vie funds between budget heads may have provided for a 
more effective, co-ordinated and adaptable response. This fragmentation of funding 
created problems of institutional territorial parochialism where Task Force members 
tended to work to their own agenda of target achievement on their own local patch 
rather than seeking solutions with a broader regional benefit.  
 
 
What is the assessment of Task Forces?  
Amid growing national disquiet concerning their effectiveness and the government’s 
role in either watering down or ignoring their policy advice (see also Ahmed, 2000; 
House of Commons, 2001; McKie, 2000), the jury is still out on Task Forces for 
organising economic development at the local and regional level. The independent 
assessment of their undoubtedly extensive activities has not been undertaken. Many 
participant organisations have not even evaluated their own involvement. The few 
final public and private domain reports from Task Forces that exist contain extensive 
lists of activities and outputs (e.g. CAPITB, 2000; East Durham Task Force, 2000; 
Fujitsu Response Group, 1999). Without independent and comparative assessment 
there is little way of verifying their claims, evaluating their relative effectiveness and 
proving their worth.  
 
While it is early days for many Task Forces, preliminary soundings reveal a mixture 
of prospects and problems (Pike, 2001). Task Forces appear to have ‘added-value’ by 
getting the relevant individuals and organisations around the table and focused on a 
particular issue. At best, Task Forces may provide a co-ordinating organisation 
capable of mobilising and involving the relevant individuals and organisations with 
the appropriate expertise to address particular economic development concerns in a 
timely fashion. Their establishment provides an adaptable focus for activity and the 
matching of regional, national and European funding support. Critical views of Task 
Forces refer to their over-use and proliferation, ad hoc and reactive manner and 
H:\lucy\papers\e&pc-paper.doc 21 
utilisation as a token and symbolic political gesture to illustrate that something was 
being done. Indeed, there is evidence of perceived resistance to ‘just another Task 
Force’ due to their failure to prevent localised decline (Wansbeck District Council 
Leader, The Journal, 28 April, 2000). At worst, the Task Force may be interpreted as 
a short-term, reactive and perhaps politically expedient organisational fix for 
economic development problems that draws upon a relatively exclusive and limited 
membership. Their specific and narrowly conceived focus, time-limited and resource-
bound nature coupled with concerns regarding their leadership, transparency and 
accountability may serve to undermine their potential effectiveness. 
 
 
Issues for Task Forces in organising economic development: 
 
The high level of involvement of the public sector and Local Authorities 
The economic development Task Forces in the North East contain high levels of 
public sector and local authority involvement. Measured in terms of individuals from 
organisations that are Task Force members, the public sector is dominant followed by 
public-private sector organisations (including RDAs and TECs due to their ‘business-
led’ boards) (Figure 2). Involvement from the private sector is lower and the 
remainder is made up of Third Sector, MPs and workforce members. In organisational 
terms, local authorities are dominant, followed by central Government organisations 
(e.g. Employment Service, Benefits Agency) and Quangos (e.g. TECs, Enterprise 
Agencies) (Figure 3)5. Firms had marginally higher levels of involvement than the 
RDA. GO-NE and trades unions made up the next highest categories. Alongside 
voluntary and employer’s organisations, FE and HE had roughly equal levels of 
involvement. The issue is whether this high level of involvement of the public sector 
and local authorities is a question of dependence or domination. On the one hand, 
Task Forces can be seen as heavily reliant upon the involvement of the public sector 
and local authorities in providing staff, resources and leadership. Indeed, several 
heavily committed local authorities complained of ‘Task Force fatigue’ and the over-
stretching of already over-committed individuals and organisations. On the other 
hand, the Task Forces were established to bring together a plural array of interests to 
address a particular concern and could perhaps be less effective if dominated by a 
particular interest group, albeit a democratically legitimate one. Compounding this 
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issue, private sector involvement has been less significant and contingent upon 
particular circumstances, ranging from constructive and supportive to obstructive and 
damaging. 
 
 
Time-limited or standing bodies? 
Given the ingrained structural problems and recurrent need for regeneration in regions 
like the North East, the question arises whether a proliferation of time-limited, ad hoc 
and piecemeal responses to economic development is sufficient. Task Forces may be 
rather limited organisations addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of 
economic decline. In addition, the RDA and some local authorities were beginning to 
feel the strain of heavy involvement in a range of Task Forces (Table 3). Members 
were adamant that Task Forces should be time-limited and task-focused. However, a 
grey area emerged in relation to the broader context of the duration of Task Force 
operation. Given their initially indeterminate life-span, their duration of operation 
varied significantly – from under 12 months to currently ongoing after 2 years – 
depending upon the contingent nature of their specific circumstances.  
 
The question is whether a more strategic, integrated and co-ordinated approach could 
be taken to structural economic development concerns rather than simply expanding 
the flotilla of Task Forces to address the symptoms. Such an approach may need to be 
provided by a standing body – a single organisation, infrastructure or network of 
individuals and organisations – that might be better placed to deal with situations 
before or as they emerge. Such a regionally rooted body could perhaps ‘get a feel’ – 
not in the sense of a prediction or forecast – for situations before they develop into 
crises. An example is the ‘South Tyneside Redundancies – Rapid Response Group’ 
that meets regularly to chase progress on previous activities, reviews current work, 
tries to pick up the ‘weak signals’ of impending problems and is accountable to its 
local authority (Pike, 1999b). This may prove workable and manageable only at the 
local rather than the regional level. While this role was acknowledged by the RDA, it 
was somewhat reticent about taking sole responsibility for such an ongoing strategic 
overview. In particular, it was also generally unclear how such a regional overview 
could take account of and link meaningfully into local situations, perhaps requiring a 
H:\lucy\papers\e&pc-paper.doc 23 
stronger role for the newly established Sub-Regional Partnerships (Northumberland, 
Tyne and Wear, Durham, Tees Valley). 
 
Co-ordination 
The recent proliferation of Task Forces in the North East raises the question of their 
over-use and lack of co-ordination. Being short-term, ‘quick fix’ and ad hoc leaves 
them vulnerable to repeated utilisation particularly for regions with structural 
economic development problems. The spirit of the Task Force suggests it is in some 
sense special and for utilisation in exceptional circumstances. Staff, resources and 
effort can be redirected from their existing work and marshalled at short notice to 
address crisis situations. Yet there is a danger that Task Forces become part of the 
normal repertoire of responses to economic development issues. The lack of clear 
criteria regarding their establishment reinforces this problem. Over-use can cause a 
drain on organisational energy and create fatigue from constantly having to ‘firefight’ 
short-term issues and meet the demand for involvement in Task Forces (Table 3). 
There are signs that this problem is being recognised but not remedied since the Task 
Force model is considered a valid response to particular problem situations rather than 
something that the ‘regional partnership’ would like to see manifest and ongoing. 
 
This sporadic way in which economic development Task Forces have flowered across 
the region underlines the need for co-ordination. Whereby duplication and overlap are 
avoided and complementarity fostered with the activities of existing partners – not all 
of whom end up being invited to become members of the Task Forces. 
Notwithstanding situations where individuals hold multiple memberships, 
opportunities for learning and interaction between Task Forces have rarely been 
maximised. The question is where the locus of any co-ordination authority should lie 
within an increasingly multi-layered governance structure operating across a range of 
scales? Who has the strategic overview and vision to make sense of how these things 
fit together for the benefit of the region? The RDA? The Sub-Regional Partnerships? 
A newly beefed-up GO-NE? (see Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000). 
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Transparency and accountability 
The transparency and accountability of Task Forces is a concern. Task Forces appear 
to be contributing to the ‘democratic deficit’ caused by the growth of ‘quasi-
governance’ spending public money and being run by people who are unelected and 
unaccountable (House of Commons, 2001; Skelcher et al., 2000). Indeed, the former 
Chair of the Public Administration Select Committee, Rhodri Morgan claimed that 
just as the Quangos were being brought under the control of the Nolan reforms of 
public appointments Task Forces emerged as a new ‘second phalanx’ of Quangos 
outside these rules (Barker et al., 1999). Regionally too, concerns have been 
articulated, for instance, regarding the future of the Sunderland ARC Task Force:  
“The regeneration company is a good thing and I am happy to sign up to it. 
But the question is how it is set up and who it is accountable to. We don’t 
want another development corporation-type body with the problem of 
accountability. The Sunderland partnership wants to be part of the operation” 
(Leader of Sunderland City Council quoted in Heywood, 2000). 
Economic development Task Forces in the North East are largely able to proffer 
policy advice, spend public money and co-ordinate implementation in private and 
without wider political debate. Their largely functional role and often technocratic 
modus operandi tends to ‘de-politicise’ many issues that should properly lie within 
the political sphere, despite the limited involvement of local and national politicians. 
There remains a strong case to answer for Task Forces in terms of their transparency 
and accountability. 
 
While they are non-statutory (unlike Quangos), Task Force’s accountability is 
questionable on two fronts. First, their narrow financial accountability is often 
fragmented since the Task Force is usually not the main funding vehicle but is 
supported by the mainstream programmes of its members. Second is the issue of 
wider democratic accountability. Some Task Forces have been answerable to the 
relevant central government Minister that established them but the local and regional 
dimension of accountability is limited. The local authority-based Task Forces have 
come nearest to conventional democratic scrutiny of the Task Forces. Here, local 
authority Officers involved in the Task Forces have had to report back to the full 
Council of Members and respond to questions, although how much influence this has 
had on the Task Force’s operation is unclear. Several Task Forces deflected the 
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accountability question by claiming that in an era of waning public faith in the 
democratic process they conducted more meaningful consultation with their target 
local communities regarding their plans. This may signal their desire to shift away 
from traditional democratic forms of accountability. 
 
At the heart of this transparency and accountability problem for Task Forces is their 
membership. Patronage is a concern alongside the potential for a descent into a cosy 
‘court politics’ of favourites and hangers-on that stifles debate and discussion of 
alternative economic development strategies in preference to the prevailing ‘common 
sense’. Since membership is constructed through careful selection and private invite 
from the instigating organisation, often in relative haste, the Task Forces have tended 
to be exclusive rather than inclusive. The first signs of a new elite of the 'usual 
suspects' of appointed or nominated members – with no doubt valuable skills and 
experience to offer – has begun to emerge raising concerns over undue and sectional 
influence and the domination of regional governance by an emergent regional service 
class (Lovering, 1999). While the vast majority (84%) of individuals involved held 
memberships in only one Task Force, nearly 12% were on two, 3% on three and just 
over 2% on four (Table 4). In addition, the gender of Task Force members is 
overwhelmingly dominated by men, only 48 of 326 (15%) were women (see 
Robinson and Shaw, 2000). 
 
How can Task Forces be made more transparent and accountable? How might their 
membership be monitored and regulated? Should they be made publicly to publish 
meeting minutes and final reports? Where should they sit in the emerging territorial 
governance structure for economic development in the UK? Given their proliferation 
these are thorny questions. Potentially, Task Forces could be made answerable and 
open to scrutiny by the relevant democratically legitimate bodies in the territories in 
which they operate. This might be more easily solved at the local and county levels 
through local authorities. At the regional level, this might happen via the scrutiny role 
of the Regional Chamber over the RDA in the absence of elected regional 
government.  
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Conclusions 
This paper has sought to examine the utilisation of Task Forces as an institutional co-
ordination mechanism through an empirical analysis of the experience of the North 
East region of England in using Task Forces to organise economic development 
activity. The study argues that New Labour’s use of Task Forces reflects a particular 
mediation of more general tendencies and emerging issues in the historical evolution 
of state modernisation. Further particular and contingent variations on the national 
picture are evident at the local and regional level in the context of an uneven process 
of ‘hollowing out’ at the national level and an increasingly multi-layered governance 
system. The Task Force concept, while not unambiguous in some areas of usage, is 
revealed as having theoretical substance and analytical merit. Nationally, the 
proliferation of Task Forces is evidence of the ‘de-statization’ of the political system 
and the uneasy tension between governance and meta-governance wherein the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Jessop, 1997: 575) cast by national/central government can be 
seen in New Labour’s extension of powers over the institutional forms of government. 
Task Forces have been used as a pragmatic means of ‘getting things done’ in often 
complex and uncertain situations without any apparent ideological hang-ups about 
how such policy should be developed and delivered. This has meant incorporating 
producer and private sector interests and claims about mixing state and market 
solutions to intractable issues ‘Third Way’-style. In contrast, evidence from the 
economic development Task Forces in the North East region reveals pragmatic and 
emergent changes in the mode and nature of state institutional forms but they are 
overwhelmingly dominated in their membership by public (especially local 
authorities) and public/private (especially RDAs, TECs) sector institutions. Private 
sector involvement is somewhat less significant and contingent upon the particular 
circumstances the Task Force is addressing. State and para-state forms appear to 
remain prevalent for organising economic development at the local and regional level. 
 
Nationally, New Labour’s use of Task Forces as mechanisms for utilising external 
expertise has reinforced the sense that existing public institutions are unable 
effectively to deliver. In contrast, the evidence from this empirical case suggests that 
existing (central and local) public institutions constitute the clear majority of Task 
Force members and resources and external expertise is evident in only a handful of 
cases. While it may be functional to government to present Task Forces as an 
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additional response, the local and regional economic development variety illustrate 
that it is the existing public institutions – albeit working within new organisational 
forms – that are doing the work on the ground. Across scales Task Forces are clear 
evidence of the institutional experimentation characteristic of the current era of state 
modernisation, albeit mediated by the evolution of the UK’s particular political 
economy. The economic development Task Forces in the North East are an emergent 
organisational form developed as a containing response to crisis-laden economic 
development issues at employer, sectoral and/or territorial levels. No clear blueprint is 
evident but a relatively coherent model is emerging – adaptive to specific 
circumstances – that is constructed through the selective incorporation of shared 
interest groups, mainly from the public and public/private sectors. These Task Forces 
remain experimental and are largely unproven due to the absence of independent 
assessment, although they claim (with some voracity) varying degrees of success in 
achieving their objectives. The peculiarly UK twist to this narrative is that these Task 
Forces appear to be contributing to the growth of ‘quasi-governance’ (Skelcher et al., 
2000) and its attendant problems of co-ordination, transparency and accountability. 
The North East’s economic development Task Forces confirm this national view as 
the evidence revealed issues of over-use and proliferation, lack of co-ordination and 
limited local and regional transparency and accountability. 
 
“A project which began with a slogan of ‘de-quangofication’…[has] led to a 
circumstance in which quangos, task forces, commissions have multiplied and 
proliferated. And this is a deep paradox…unless we grapple with this irony in 
all of its depth…we’ll be stuck with a situation in which we’ll have countless 
ephemeral, unremembered and ineffective quangos proliferating against a 
background of weakened ineffective institutions or their shadows” (John Gray, 
quoted in Walker, 2000). 
Task Forces may turn out to be rather more profound in their significance than 
initially thought. Two deeper currents are pertinent. First, the state’s mode of crisis 
management appears under threat. As Gray suggests, there is mounting scrutiny and 
criticism of such ‘quasi-governance’ and growing demands that appropriate co-
ordination, transparency and accountability measures be established for such public 
institutions, particularly in the context of devolution (Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, 2000; House of Commons, 2001; Skelcher et al., 2000; Scottish 
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Executive, 2001). A second, reinforcing point, is that the abdication of government 
responsibility and reliance upon the ‘authority of expertise’ (Walker, 2000) provided 
by Task Forces avoids the deeper questions about what kind of economic 
development and for whom? Such value-laden questions cannot simply be resolved by 
a technocracy since they are inherently conflictual. A renewed and democratised 
politics of economic development governance is required to render the answers and 
decision-making relating to such questions transparent, legitimate and accountable in 
the context of the UK political economy’s emergent multi-layered governance system.  
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Table 1: Economic Development Task Forces in the North East region (As of May 2001) 
 
Level Focus Location Established Established by 
Centura Foods Hartlepool 2001 Hartlepool District Council 
Courtaulds Peterlee, County Durham 1999 Easington District Council 
Dewhirst Easington, County Durham 1999 Easington District Council 
Electrolux Spennymoor, County 
Durham 
1998 Sedgefield District Council 
Fujitsu Newton Aycliffe, County 
Durham 
1998 Peter Mandelson#, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry 
Grove Cranes* City of Sunderland, Tyne 
and Wear 
1998 Sunderland City Council 
Onwa* South Tyneside, Tyne and 
Wear 
1999 Richard Caborn, Minister for Regions, 
Regeneration and Planning 
Pringle Berwick-Upon-Tweed, 
Northumberland* 
1998 Berwick-Upon-Tweed District Council 
Rothmans Spennymoor, County 
Durham 
1999 Stephen Byers, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employer 
Siemens North Tyneside, Tyne and 
Wear 
1998 Peter Mandelson#, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry 
National Oil and Gas 
Fabrication Support Group 
National, including North 
East region 
1999 DTI (National) 
North East Oil and Gas 
Fabrication Action Group** 
North East region 2000 ONE North East 
South Tyneside Call Centre 
Group 
South Tyneside 2001 South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 
Steel Industry (Corus) Teesside 2000 Stephen Byers, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry 
Textiles North East region 1999 Stephen Byers, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sectoral 
Tyne Maritime Group** North East region 2000 -** 
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Small Business Service North East region - - 
'Berwick-Upon-Tweed 
Regeneration Task Force' 
Berwick-Upon-Tweed, 
Northumberland 
1998 Berwick-Upon-Tweed District Council 
Blyth Blyth, Northumberland 2001 Blyth Valley Borough Council 
East Durham Task Force County Durham 1990 Durham County Council 
North West Durham Task 
Force 
County Durham 1999 Durham County Council 
South Tyneside Strategic 
Action Group* 
South Tyneside, Tyne and 
Wear 
1999 Richard Caborn, Minister for Regions, 
Regeneration and Planning 
‘South Tyneside 
Redundancies – Rapid 
Response Group’ 
South Tyneside, Tyne and 
Wear 
1998 South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 
South West Durham Task 
Force 
County Durham 1999 Durham County Council 
‘Sunderland ARC of 
Opportunity’ 
City of Sunderland, Tyne 
and Wear 
1999 Stephen Byers, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry 
South East Northumberland 
and North Tyneside 
Wansbeck and Blyth 
Valley, Northumberland 
North Tyneside 
1999 Richard Caborn, Minister for Regions, 
Regeneration and Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area 
Urban Task Force Cities (National) 1997 John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Secretary of State for the Department of 
Environment, Transport and Regions 
 
Italicised Task Forces included in the audit; * Employer-based Task Force became sub-regional; ** Tyne Maritime Group evolved from the 
North East Oil and Gas Fabrication Action Group as well as the River Tyne Strategy Group, Tyne Users Group and the Åker McNulty 
Workforce Committee (Figure 1); *** English region coalfields only; # Then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 
 
Source: Author’s Task Force Audit (2000) 
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Table 2: Examples of Task Force Aims by Type 
 
Employer-based Sectoral Area-based 
Redeploy and/or retrain 
redundant workforce 
Secure sale of facility 
and/or site 
Assess community and 
supply chain impact 
Analyse sectoral/regional 
situation 
Recommendations to 
improve competitiveness 
and retain employment 
Assist redundant 
workforce 
Focus attention on target 
area problems and 
opportunities 
Develop action 
programmes and initiatives 
Monitor and review 
progress 
Improve co-ordination and 
integration between 
agencies 
 
Source: Author’s Research (2000) 
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Table 3: Number of Task Force Organisational Memberships Ranked by Organisation 
 
Organisation Number of Task Force 
Organisational 
Memberships 
RDA (ONE North East) 28 
Government Office-North East 26 
Durham County Council 21 
Employment Service 17 
County Durham TEC 10 
South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 9 
North Tyneside Council 8 
Easington District Council 7 
English Partnerships 7 
GMB trade union 7 
Sedgefield Borough Council 7 
Tyneside TEC 7 
 
Source: Author’s Task Force Audit (2000) 
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Table 4: Number of Task Force Memberships Held by Individuals 
 
Number of Task Force Memberships Frequency % 
1 273 83.5 
2 38 11.6 
3 9 2.8 
4 7 2.1 
Total 327* 100.0 
* Information available only for 327 of the total 351 Task Force memberships. 
 
Source: Author’s Task Force Audit (2000) 
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Figure 2: Number of Task Force O rganisational M emberships by Sector
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Figure 3: Number of Task Force Organisational Membership by Type of Organisation
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1
 This paper draws upon research supported by the University Research Committee, University of Newcastle and South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council. Thanks to 
Stuart Dawley for his research assistance. Thanks to the participants in this project, especially Bob Dobbie and Chris Pretty (GO-NE) and Ken Frankish and Shân Warren 
(Durham County Council) for the audit reports. This paper has also benefited from comments made by John Tomaney and Alan Harding, two anonymous referees as well as 
participants at the Urban Regeneration Workshop (University of Durham, November 2000), CURDS Internal Seminar (University of Newcastle, December 2000) and the 
Human Geography Seminar (University of Liverpool, January 2001). The usual disclaimers, as always, apply. 
2
 Andy Pike is a lecturer and researcher in the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), University of Newcastle. His research interests are in the 
political economy of local and regional development. He is currently working on projects concerned with economic development in the Anglo-Scottish Borders (CURDS) 
and the economic and social implications of Best Value in the North East region of England (UNISON Northern). 
3
 This empirical research is drawn from a study that sought to investigate the local and regional economic development Task Forces in the North East region of England in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. In-depth interviews were conducted with over 20 key informants from within the local and regional economic development community, 
including Task Force members and national civil servants. An audit of documentary evidence was also undertaken concerning the extent and character of economic 
development Task Force organisation and structure (Table 1). The broadly constituted national Task Forces linked to government departments that indirectly impinged upon 
economic development issues, for example the DTI Competitiveness Task Force, were excluded from this study. 
4
 A Task Force organisational membership is where an individual from an organisation is a member of a Task Force. The 351 is the total number of organisational 
memberships and includes individuals from organisations who are members of more than one Task Force (See Table 4). 
5
 The ‘Regional Assembly’ category (Figure 3) under-represents the involvement of members of the Regional Assembly since the majority of Regional Assembly members 
have been recorded as representatives of their employer (e.g. local authorities, employer’s organisations, trade unions). 
